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Sanktjohanser, Anna
(2026)
Optimally stubborn: how long to hold and who will fold?
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 21 (n°2).
pp. 402-433.
This is the latest version of this item.
Abstract
I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immediate agreement or long delays.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | May 2026 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Sep 2026 09:25 |
| Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2026 09:26 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:132149 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/54000 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Optimally Stubborn. (deposited 05 Oct 2022 11:43)
- Optimally stubborn: how long to hold and who will fold? (deposited 30 Sep 2026 09:25) [Currently Displayed]
