Pouyet, Jérôme and Martimort, David (2026) "The Incentive Virtues of Performance-Based Trade Allowances and Loss Leading". Journal of Industrial Economics. (In Press)

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Abstract

A retailer can boost demand for a manufacturer’s product through non-verifiable activities. Performance-based trade allowances—rebates conditional on the retailer’s successful sales efforts—help mitigate this moral hazard problem. In equilibrium, the wholesale contract includes a retail price set below cost, complemented by a rebate for incremental units purchased when efforts successfully increase sales. Loss leading thus emerges as an incentive mechanism, rather than a practice driven by anti-competitive or exploitative intent. A ban on below-cost pricing leads to higher retail prices and reduced promotional efforts.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2026
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Oxford
Uncontrolled Keywords: vertical restraints, moral hazard, loss leading, performance-based allowances, below-cost pricing
JEL Classification: L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2026 08:09
Last Modified: 07 Sep 2026 08:10
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:132045
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/53938

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