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Bontems, Philippe
, Calmette, Marie-Françoise and Martimort, David
(2026)
Tarification d’accès et qualité du réseau dans le transport ferroviaire.
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1753
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Abstract
This paper studies access pricing in a vertically separated railway sector where the in-frastructure manager sets access charges and chooses network quality, while downstream operators choose transport services. The model characterizes the inefficiencies of unregula-ted vertical separation and then derives optimal regulation with and without public transfers. When transfers are constrained, access charges follow a Ramsey logic modified by downs-tream market power and by cross-effects among long-distance operators. Under asymmetric information, the relevant access cost is no longer the physical marginal cost but a virtual cost that incorporates the information rents of the infrastructure manager and the traffic consequences of incentive constraints.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | French |
| Date: | June 2026 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Access pricing, tarification d’accès, railroad regulation, régulation ferroviaire, vertical separation, séparation verticale, infrastructure quality, qualité de l’infrastructure, asymmetric information, asymétrie d’information, mechanism design, rentes informationnelles, information rents |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L51 - Economics of Regulation L92 - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation - Autos, Buses, Trucks, and Water Carriers; Ports |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Jun 2026 12:31 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Jun 2026 12:31 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131798 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/53719 |
