Enache, Andreea and Rhodes, Andrew (2026) Platform Disintermediation with Repeated Transactions. Management Science, Vol.72 (n°8). pp. 6433-7379.

Abstract

We consider a setting in which a platform matches buyers and sellers, who then wish to transact with each other multiple times. The platform charges fees for hosting transactions but also offers convenience benefits. We consider two scenarios. In one scenario, all transactions must occur on the platform; in the other scenario, buyers and sellers can disintermediate the platform after the first transaction and do subsequent transactions offline. We find that the platform reacts to disintermediation by using a “front-loaded” pricing scheme, whereby it charges more for earlier transactions. We also show that sometimes the platform is better off when disintermediation is possible—because it can use disintermediation to screen users’ private information about their convenience benefits. Buyers are not necessarily better off when they can disintermediate due to the way in which the platform adjusts its fees.

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