Ivanik, Vasilii and Lukyanov, Georgy (2025) Contrarian Incentives and Costly Social Learning. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1679, Toulouse

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Abstract

We study social learning when agents choose costly information and prefer less
popular actions. Popularity changes decision cutoffs and can restore the value of
information. Under diminishing, nonsummable popularity updates, we characterize
complete belief learning by positive attainable net information value at every
interior belief, allowing vanishing entry fees and experiments approaching no information.
With Gaussian signals and power precision costs, learning is complete
exactly when contrarian incentives can align every belief and costs vanish faster
than the square root of precision. Under weaker incentives, optimal purchases can
have a positive precision floor and a finite expected count even without an entry
fee. Rapid popularity updating can also stop learning despite profitable alignment.
A positive fixed fee uniformly bounds purchases; a binary illustration characterizes
terminal errors and separates belief accuracy from the frequency of correct actions.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2025
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: social learning, information cascades, endogenous information acquisition, nonconformity, popularity, Bayesian thresholds.
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D85 - Network Formation and Analysis - Theory
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2025 09:52
Last Modified: 20 Oct 2026 12:46
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:131013
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51283
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