Lukyanov, Georgy (2026) Capacity, Patronage, and Exit from Mutual Credit. TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1676, Toulouse

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Abstract

Member-owned lenders pool project returns and rebate surplus as patronage, insuring borrowers but tying membership value to pool composition. We study a capacityconstrained mutual alongside competitive market debt. Market access initially complements the mutual by financing rationed borrowers. Once capacity is broad enough, however, high-return members prefer individual debt to subsidizing the common pool and exit. Their departure frees capacity for low-return members but destroys risk sharing. Market access therefore raises welfare at low capacity and lowers it near full capacity: cream-skimming begins strictly before it becomes harmful. The mechanism survives incomplete pooling.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2026
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: mutual credit, patronage refunds, market access, credit rationing, risk sharing
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
K22 - Corporation and Securities Law
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 17 Oct 2025 08:35
Last Modified: 04 Nov 2026 16:30
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:131006
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51278
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