Lukyanov, Georgy
(2026)
Capacity, Patronage, and Exit from Mutual Credit.
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1676, Toulouse
Preview |
Text
Download (511kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Member-owned lenders pool project returns and rebate surplus as patronage, insuring borrowers but tying membership value to pool composition. We study a capacityconstrained mutual alongside competitive market debt. Market access initially complements the mutual by financing rationed borrowers. Once capacity is broad enough, however, high-return members prefer individual debt to subsidizing the common pool and exit. Their departure frees capacity for low-return members but destroys risk sharing. Market access therefore raises welfare at low capacity and lowers it near full capacity: cream-skimming begins strictly before it becomes harmful. The mechanism survives incomplete pooling.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | October 2026 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | mutual credit, patronage refunds, market access, credit rationing, risk sharing |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation K22 - Corporation and Securities Law |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2025 08:35 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Nov 2026 16:30 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:131006 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/51278 |

Tools
Tools