Yamashita, Takuro and Smolin, Alexey (2022) Information design in concave games. In: EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. Pennock, David M. (ed.) Association for Computing Machinery. Series “ACM Conferences.” New-York. p. 870. ISBN 978-1-4503-9150-4

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Identification Number : 10.1145/3490486.3538303


We study information design in games with a continuum of actions such that the payoff of each player is concave in his action. A designer chooses an information structure--a joint distribution of a state and a private signal of each player. The information structure induces a Bayesian game and is evaluated according to the expected designer's payoff under the equilibrium play.
We develop a method that allows to find an optimal information structure, one that cannot be outperformed by any other information structure, however complex. To do so, we exploit the property that each player's incentive is summarized by his marginal payoff. We show that an information structure is optimal whenever the induced strategies can be implemented by an incentive contract in a principal-agent problem that incorporates the players' marginal payoffs. We use this result to establish the optimality of Gaussian information structures in the settings with quadratic payoffs and a multivariate normally-distributed state. We analyze the details of optimal structures in a differentiated Bertrand competition and in a prediction game.

Item Type: Book Section
Language: English
Date: July 2022
Place of Publication: New-York.
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, Concave games, First-order approach, Gaussian information structures, Information design, Selective informing, Weak duality
JEL Classification: D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2023 09:54
Last Modified: 26 Jun 2023 09:06
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:128002
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/47318

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