Yamashita, Takuro and Moriya, Fumitoshi (2022) Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations. AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 112. pp. 444-451.

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Identification Number : 10.1257/pandp.20221089


Organizations may suffer from unforeseen negative shocks, potentially leading to severe bottlenecks. This paper studies an optimal incentive scheme robust to those shocks in the effort induction problem in team production. The optimal scheme under the no-shock assumption is typically vulnerable in that a single shock can lead to shirking of sizable non-shocked members. We show that an optimal scheme is associated with a uniform order of worker subsets; and identify relative complementarity as a novel source of the determinant of the optimal organization structure.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: May 2022
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L23 - Organization of Production
M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, work arrangemetns, job satisfaction)
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2023 12:06
Last Modified: 29 Mar 2023 12:06
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:128000
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/47316
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