Decarolis, Francesco, Goldmanis, Maris, Penta, Antonio and Shakhgildyan, Ksenia (2023) Bid coordination in sponsored search auctions: detection methodology and empirical analysis. Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 71 (n° 2). pp. 570-592.

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Identification Number : 10.1111/joie.12331

Abstract

Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in internet ad auctions. When the same intermediary bids for competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by bid coordination. When the method is applied to data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55% of the cases of delegated bidding and the search engine's revenue loss ranges between 5.3% and 10.4%.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2023
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2023 10:11
Last Modified: 30 Nov 2023 13:18
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:127804
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/46764

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