Canta, Chiara and Cremer, Helmuth (2026) Family bargaining and the gender gap in informal care. TSE Working Paper, n. 2022-1352, Toulouse

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Abstract

We study the optimal long-term care (LTC) policy when informal care can be provided by children in exchange for monetary transfers from their elderly parents. We consider a bargaining model with single-child families, where daughters have lower labor market wages, and bargaining power within the family varies by the child’s gender.
In the laissez-faire scenario, daughters always provide more informal care than sons. When their bargaining weight is smaller, they also experience lower welfare; however, this may be reversed if their bargaining weight is sufficiently high. The first-best outcome involves redistribution from families with sons to families with daughters and can be implemented through a gender-specific schedule of public LTC benefits and state-contingent transfers to adult children.
Gender neutrality disadvantages families with daughters and may even leave daughters worse off than under laissez faire. It also leads to a distorted allocation of care within families with daughters and affects the distribution of transfers in all families.

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• Family bargaining and the gender gap in informal care. (deposited 01 Sep 2022 07:33) [Currently Displayed]
  • Family Bargaining and the Gender Gap in Informal Care. (deposited 11 Sep 2026 08:33)