Lefouili, Yassine and Madio, Leonardo (2022) The Economics of Platform Liability. European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 53 (n° 3). pp. 319-351.

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Identification Number : 10.1007/s10657-022-09728-7


Public authorities in many jurisdictions are concerned about the proliferation of illegal content and products on online platforms. One often discussed solution is to make the platform liable for third parties’ misconduct. In this paper, we first identify platform incentives to stop online misconduct in the absence of liability. Then, we provide an economic appraisal of platform liability that highlights the intended and unintended effects of a more stringent liability rule on several key variables such as prices, terms and conditions, business models, and investments. Specifically, we discuss the impact of the liability regime applying to online platforms on competition between them and the incentives of third parties relying on them. Finally, we analyze the potential costs and benefits of measures that have received much attention in recent policy discussions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: June 2022
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Dordrecht
Uncontrolled Keywords: Liability rules, online platform, illegal content and products, intellectual property
JEL Classification: K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability
K40 - General
K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure - Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates; Subsidiaries
L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 01 Jul 2022 09:02
Last Modified: 02 Oct 2023 09:07
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:127055
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/45887
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