Assad, Stephanie, Calvano, Emilio, Calzolari, Giacomo, Clark, Robert, Denicolo, Vincenzo, Ershov, Daniel, Johnson, Justin Pappas, Pastorello, Sergio, Rhodes, Andrew, XU, Lei and Wildenbeest, Matthijs (2021) Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications. TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1210, Toulouse

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Abstract

Markets are being populated with new generations of pricing algorithms, powered with Artificial Intelligence, that hve the ability to autonomously learn to operate. This ability can be both a source of efficiency and cause of concern for the risk that algorithms autonomously and tacitly learn to collude. In this paper we explore recent developments in the economic literature and discuss implications for policy.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2021
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Algorithmic Pricing, Antitrust, Competition Policy, Artificial Intelligence, Collusion, Platforms.
JEL Classification: D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 27 May 2021 14:05
Last Modified: 05 Jan 2024 09:52
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:125584
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43525

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