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Mitraille, Sébastien
and Moreaux, Michel
(2011)
Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly.
TSE Working Paper, n. 11-249, Toulouse
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Abstract
Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash- perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leader- ship over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting
from increased competition and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and competition increase due to the strategic use of inventories.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 27 July 2011 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 06:04 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:24803 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3603 |
