Armantier, Olivier and Treich, Nicolas (2010) Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-156, Toulouse

There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of 10-156.pdf]
Download (1MB) | Preview


Accurate measurements of probabilistic beliefs have become increasingly important both in practice and in academia. Introduced by statisticians in the 1950s to promote truthful reports in simple environments, Proper Scoring Rules (PSR) are now arguably the most popular incentivized mechanisms to elicit an agent's beliefs. This paper generalizes the analysis of PSR to richer environments
relevant to economists. More specifically, we combine theory and experiment to study how beliefs reported with a PSR may be biased when i) the PSR payments are increased, ii) the agent has a financial stake in the event she is predicting, and iii) the agent can hedge her prediction by taking an additional action. Our results reveal complex distortions of reported beliefs, thereby raising concerns about the
ability of PSR to recover truthful beliefs in general economic environments.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 15 April 2010
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:01
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:36
OAI Identifier:

Available Versions of this Item

View Item


Downloads per month over past year