Auriol, Emmanuelle and Biancini, Sara (2009) Intellectual Property Rights Adoption in Developing Countries. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-094

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Abstract

This paper studies the incentives that developing countries have to enforce intellectual properties rights (IPR). On the one hand, free-riding on rich countries technology reduces the investment cost in R&D. On the other hand, it yields apotential indirect cost: a firm that violates IPR cannot legally export in a country that enforces them. IPR act like a barrier to entry of the advanced economy markets. Moreover free-riders cannot prevent other to copy their own innovation. The analysis, which distinguishes between large and small developing countries, predicts that small ones should be willing to respect IPR if they want to export and access advanced economies markets, while large emerging countries, such as China and India, will be more reluctant to do so as their huge domestic markets develop. Global welfare is higher under the full protection regime if the developing country does not innovate. It is higher under a partial regime if both countries have access to similar R&D technology and the developing country market is large enough.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: October 2009
JEL Classification: F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Trade Organizations
F15 - Economic Integration
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
O31 - Innovation and Invention - Processes and Incentives
O34 - Intellectual Property Rights - National and International Issues
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:01
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:36
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:22270
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3310
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