Garrett, Daniel F. (2016) Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival.

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Abstract

This paper studies the design of e¢ cient mechanisms for repeated trade in settings where (i) tradersvalues and costs evolve randomly with time, and (ii) the traders become ready and available to participate in the mechanism at random times. Under a weak condition, analogous to the non-overlapping supports condition of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), e¢ cient trade is only feasible if the mechanism runs an expected budget decit. The smallest such decit is attainable by a sequence of static mechanisms.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2016
Refereed: No
Uncontrolled Keywords: dynamic mechanism design, repeated trade, budget balance, dynamic arrivals, participation constraints
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 20 Aug 2019 10:03
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2021 13:37
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31910
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32653
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