Alger, Ingela, Juarez, Laura, Juarez-Torres, Miriam and Miquel-Florensa, Josepa (2020) Do informal transfers induce lower efforts? Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Mexico. Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 69 (n° 1). pp. 107-171.

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Identification Number : 10.1086/702858

Abstract

How does informal risk sharing affect incentives to avoid risk? While moral hazard is expected under formal insurance, theory suggests that the incentive effects of informal risk sharing are ambiguous: internalization of the external effects of transfers on others may reduce or enhance incentives to avoid risk. To study this issue, which is particularly relevant for developing economies, we designed a novel real-effort lab experiment and conducted it in 16 small villages in rural Mexico. We find that subjects internalize the effects of transfers enough for the presence of transfers to significantly increase effort compared to autarky situations.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: October 2020
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: informal insurance, effort, moral hazard, free-riding effect, empathy effect
JEL Classification: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D64 - Altruism
O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2018 09:28
Last Modified: 31 Oct 2021 02:00
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32938
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26252

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