Correia da silva, Joao, Jullien, Bruno, Lefouili, Yassine and Pinho, Joana (2019) Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 28 (n° 1). pp. 109-124.

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of wp_tse_946.pdf]
Download (340kB) | Preview
Identification Number : 10.1111/jems.12309


This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of "average-marginal-cost-preserving" mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: January 2019
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mergers, Multi-Sided Platforms, Cournot Competition
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2018 09:22
Last Modified: 10 Sep 2021 11:32
OAI Identifier:

Available Versions of this Item

View Item


Downloads per month over past year