Avenel, Eric and Caprice, Stéphane (2018) Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée. Revue économique, vol. 69 (n° 1). pp. 5-28.

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Identification Number : 10.3917/reco.pr2.0110


We analyze the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. Entrants depend on the vertically integrated firms on the intermediate market for the purchasing of good. While the entry threat leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that profits are lower in the punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat facilitates collusion, thus benefiting to incumbents.

Item Type: Article
Language: French
Date: 2018
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Paris.
Uncontrolled Keywords: collusion, intégration verticale, entrée, exclusion
JEL Classification: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L23 - Organization of Production
L40 - General
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2017 10:06
Last Modified: 17 Jun 2021 07:43
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31585
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23281
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