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Dubois, Pierre
and Jullien, Bruno
(2016)
Product Design and Decision Rights in Vertical Structures.
Research in Economics, 70.
pp. 558-568.
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Abstract
The paper argues that the emergence of private labels can be partially explained by the new information technologies available at the retail level. In our approach, the owner of a brand has ìdecision rightsîon product design, while the details of the production and distribution are left to contractual negotiation. Manufacturers have privileged information about the cost of improving quality, while distributors have private information on the impact of quality on demand. We show that ownership of the brand should be allocated to the party with a relative informational advantage. In particular, if the information of the distributor improves due to a technological shock on data collection and information management, it may become optimal for the distributor to introduce its own brand, rather than to distribute a manufacturerís brand.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2016 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | store brand, private label, asymmetric information, vertical structures, product design, decision rights |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Nov 2016 14:32 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:54 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:31159 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22495 |
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Product Design and Decision Rights in Vertical Structures. (deposited 09 Nov 2016 14:37)
- Product Design and Decision Rights in Vertical Structures. (deposited 09 Nov 2016 14:32) [Currently Displayed]
