Kübler, Dorothea, Weibull, Jörgen W. and Huck, Steffen (2012) Social norms and economic incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 83 (N° 2). pp. 173-185.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.005


This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team
production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper
incentives can arise.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2012
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 19 Jul 2016 14:00
Last Modified: 22 Nov 2023 09:34
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:26389
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22219
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