Ramalingam, Abhijit, Rojo Arjona, David, Schram, Arthur and Van Leeuwen, Boris (2015) Authority and Centrality: Power and Cooperation in Social Dilemma Networks. IAST working paper, n. 15-23, Toulouse

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Official URL : http://iast.fr/pub/29140


We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: March 2015
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Power, cooperation, networks, public goods
JEL Classification: C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D02 - Institutions - Design, Formation, and Operations
D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
H41 - Public Goods
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 06 Jun 2016 08:25
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2021 13:36
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:29140
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/21631
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