Salamanca Lugo, Andrés (2016) An Egalitarian Value for Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information. TSE Working Paper, n. 16-620, Toulouse

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A bargaining solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi NTU value is defined for cooperative games with incomplete information. Our definition of a cooperative solution implies that all coalitional threats are equitable when players make interpersonal utility comparisons in terms of some virtual utility scales. In contrast, Myerson’s (1984b) generalization of the Shapley NTU value is only equitable for the grand coalition. When there are only two players, the two solutions are easily seen to coincide, however they may differ for general n-person games. By using the concept of virtual utility, our bargaining solution reflects the fact that players negotiate at the interim stage.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: February 2016
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: Cooperative games, incomplete information, virtual utility
JEL Classification: C71 - Cooperative Games
C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2016 11:46
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
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