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Avenel, Eric
and Caprice, Stéphane
(2015)
Collusion et possibilité d’entrée en aval dans une industrie verticalement intégrée.
TSE Working Paper, n. 15-613
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/29970
Abstract
We analyze the impact of an entry threat at the downstream level on the ability of a pair of vertically integrated incumbents to collude. Entrants depend on the vertically integrated firms on the intermediate market for the purchasing of good. While the entry threat leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that profits are lower in the punishment periods. Consequently, an entry threat facilitates collusion, thus benefiting to incumbents.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | French |
| Date: | November 2015 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | collusion, intégration verticale, entrée, exclusion |
| JEL Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L23 - Organization of Production L40 - General |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jun 2016 12:56 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:50 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:29970 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/19159 |
