Mariotti, Thomas (2003) Hierarchies of Compact Beliefs and Rationalizable Behavior. Economics Letters, 79 (2). pp. 199-204.

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Identification Number : 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00301-4


Following Tan and Werlang [Journal of Economic Theory 45 (1988) 370], we consider games as collections of decision problems, in which the uncertainty facing any player is the strategy choice of the other players, their beliefs about the other players’ strategy choice, and so on. A distinctive feature of our approach is that we model players’ beliefs as infinite hierarchies of compact possibility sets, rather than probability measures as in the Bayesian setup. Within this framework, we derive an axiomatic foundation for the point-rationalizability concept proposed by Bernheim [Econometrica 52 (1984) 1007].

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: May 2003
Refereed: Yes
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:50
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:34
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