Tirole, Jean (2016) From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening with Positive Selection. Econometrica, 84 (4). pp. 1291-1343.

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Abstract

In a number of interesting environments, dynamic screening involves positive selection: in contrast with Coasian dynamics, only the most motivated remain over time. The paper provides conditions under which the principal's commitment optimum is time consistent and uses this result to derive testable predictions under permanent or transient shocks. It also identifies environments in which time consistency does not hold despite positive selection, and yet simple equilibrium characterizations can be obtained.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Repeated relationships, screening, positive selection, time consistency, shifting preferences, exit games
JEL Classification: C72 - Noncooperative Games
D42 - Monopoly
D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 05 Nov 2015 15:11
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:50
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28754
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/18582

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