Guembel, Alexander and White, Lucy (2014) Good Cop, Bad Cop: Complementarities in Debt and Equity in Disciplining Management. Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 23 (n° 4). pp. 541-569.

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jfi.2014.02.004


We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions by outside claimholders. We show it can be useful to commit to inefficient liquidation when monitors fail to produce information: this provides stronger incentives to monitor. The implication for firm capital structure is that more information is generated about firm prospects – and hence firm value increases – when a firm’s cash flow is split into a ‘safe’ claim (debt) and a ‘risky’ claim (equity) compared to when a single claim is sold. We also derive the optimal allocation of control rights between safe and risky claims. This partially resolves the Tirole (2001) puzzle as to why firms issue multiple securities that generate ex post conflicts of interest.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2014
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Debt, Equity, Soft budget constraint, Monitoring
Subjects: C- GESTION > C4- Management
Divisions: TSM Research (Toulouse), TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2016 14:45
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
View Item