Cremer, Helmuth and De Donder, Philippe (2016) Life expectancy heterogeneity and the political support for collective annuities. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol.118. pp. 594-615.

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Individuals, differing in productivity and life expectancy, vote over the size and type of a collective annuity. Its type is represented by the fraction of the contributive (Bismarckian) component (based on the worker’s past earnings) as opposed to the non- contributive (Beveridgean) part (based on average contribution). The equilibrium collective annuity is either a large mostly Bismarckian program, a smaller pure Beveridgean one (in accordance with empirical evidence), or nil. A larger correlation between longevity and productivity, or a larger average life expectancy, both make the equilibrium collective annuity program more Beveridgean, although at the expense of its size.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2016
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: generosity, redistributiveness, pay-as-you-go pensions, collective annuity, longevity, Kramer-Shepsle structure-induced equilibrium
JEL Classification: D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:56
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
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