García-Valiñas, Maria A. and Zaporozhets, Vera (2015) Key-drivers of EU budget allocation: Does power matter? TSE Working Paper, n. 15-548, Toulouse

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Abstract

We examine the determinants of the EU budget expenditures allocation among different countries. Following previous literature, we consider two alternative explanations for the EU budget distribution: political power vs. 'needs view'. Taking the original data set (1976-2001) from Kauppi and Widgren (2004) we analyze whether their predictions stay robust while applying a different measure of power. We find that the nucleolus is a good alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index in the distributive situations such as the EU budget allocation. Our results also show that the relative weight of political power when explaining budget shares is lower than previous models' predictions.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Sub-title: Does power matter?
Language: English
Date: 16 January 2015
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Uncontrolled Keywords: EU policies, budget allocation, political power, nucleolus, Shapley-Shubik index
JEL Classification: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
H61 - Budget; Budget Systems
O52 - Europe
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:54
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28915
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16671

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