Casamatta, Catherine and Haritchabalet, Carole (2014) Dealing with Venture Capitalists: Shopping Around or Exclusive Negotiation. Review of Finance, 18 (5). pp. 1743-1773.

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Identification Number : 10.1093/rof/rft040


We study the fund-raising strategy of an entrepreneur when investors have private information about his project’s profitability. The entrepreneur cares about monetary profits and about the probability to obtain financing. If he contacts both venture capitalists (VCs) simultaneously, he obtains high monetary profits. If he commits to a period of exclusive negotiation with one VC, he increases the probability to obtain financing but deal terms deteriorate. The optimal negotiation strategy results from this tradeoff. We also solve for the equilibrium financial contracts and obtain implications for VCs’ portfolios and entrepreneurs’ deals.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2014
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
Divisions: TSM Research (Toulouse), TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:52
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
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