Chahrour, Ryan (2014) Public Communication and Information Acquisition. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6 (3). pp. 73-101.

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This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other pub- lic actors, between providing the public with useful information and the risk of overwhelming it with excessive communication. An information authority chooses how many signals to provide regarding an aggregate state and agents respond by choosing how many signals to observe. When agents desire co- ordination, the number of signals they acquire may decrease in the number released. The optimal quantity of communication is positive, but does not maximize agents' acquisition of information. In contrast to a model without information choice, the authority always prefers to provide more precise sig- nals.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: July 2014
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Transparency, Central Bank Communication, Monetary Policy, Information Acquisition
JEL Classification: D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
E50 - General
E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
E60 - General
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:48
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:23
OAI Identifier:
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