Greenwood, Robin, Landier, Augustin and Thesmar, David (2015) Vulnerable Banks. Journal of Financial Economics, 115 (n°3). pp. 471-485.

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Identification Number : 10.3386/w18537

Abstract

When a bank experiences an adverse shock to its equity capital, one way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. The price impact of the fire sale may impact other institutions with common exposures, resulting in contagion. We propose a simple framework that accounts for this effect. This framework explains how the distribution of leverage and risk exposures across banks contributes to systemic risk. We use it to compute a bank's exposure to sector-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillover of a bank's deleveraging onto other banks. We explain how the model can
be used to evaluate a variety of policy proposals, such as caps on size or leverage, mergers of good and bad banks, and equity injections. We then apply the framework to measure (a) the vulnerability of European banks to sovereign risk in 2010 and 2011, and (b) the vulnerability of US financial institutions between 2001 and 2010. In our model, \microprudential" interventions, which target the solvency of individual banks are always less effective than \macroprudential", policies which aim to minimize spillovers across firms.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: March 2015
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 16 Mar 2015 14:45
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:28122
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/16513

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