Martimort, David and Semenov, Aggey (2007) The Pluralistic View of Politics: Asymmetric Lobbyists, Ideological Uncertainty and Political Entry. Economics Letters, vol.97 (n°2). pp. 155-161.

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In a spatial common agency model, two asymmetric interest groups (principals)
ináuence a unique decision-maker (agent). The decision-maker chooses a onedimensional
policy on behalf of those principals and has private information about his
ideology after contracting with principals. The policy is always e¢ cient and reáects a
weighted average between the principalsí and the agentís ideal points. The decisionmakerís
expected rent can be fully extracted by congruent interest groups but not when
interest groupsíobjectives are too conáicting. The degree of congruence is endogenous. It
depends on the level of ideological uncertainty, whether interest groups can easily buy in-
áuence or not, and on their relative ideological distance with the principal. In particular,
the game of ináuence is biased towards the closest principal. This suggests that free-entry
equilibria of a lobbying game may only reáect the full diversity of the lobbying groupsí
preferences when there is enough ideological uncertainty and when those groups are close
to be equally distant to the decision-maker

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2007
Refereed: Yes
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 18:13
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:49
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