Tools
Tools
De Donder, Philippe
and Pestieau, Pierre
(2013)
Lobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation.
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-454
Preview |
Text
Download (295kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We provide an explanation for why estate taxation is surprisingly little used over the world, given the skewness of the estate distribution. Taxing estates implies meddling with intra-family decisions, which may be frown upon by many. At the same time, the concentration of estates means that a low proportion of the population stands to gain a lot by decreasing estate taxation. We provide an analytical model, together with numerical simulations, where agents bequeathing large estates make monetary contributions that are used to play up the salience of the encroachment aspects of estate taxation on family decisions in order to decrease its political support.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | December 2013 |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | estate taxation, family values, political economy, lobbying, Kantian equilibrium |
| JEL Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior H31 - Household |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:40 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:27797 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15792 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Lobbying, family concerns and the lack of political support for estate taxation. (deposited 09 Jul 2014 17:40) [Currently Displayed]
