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Centorrino, Samuele
and Concina, Laura
(2013)
A Competitive Approach to Leadership in Public Good Games.
TSE Working Paper, n. 13-383, Toulouse
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Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/26933
Abstract
We show that introducing a competitive preliminary stage in a sequential public good game
helps select one of the more cooperative leaders in the group. Using a modified second
price auction, we find that bids have a strong positive predictive power on individual contributions.
Moreover, evidence is provided that trust can explain voluntary and cooperative
leadership. However, followers reaction to voluntary leaders may rise free riding behaviour,
with uncertain effect on total public good provision.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | February 2013 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Public good experiment Leadership Self-selection Cooperation Trust Public good provision |
| JEL Classification: | A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values C72 - Noncooperative Games C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior H41 - Public Goods Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 09 Jul 2014 17:33 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:48 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:26933 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/15533 |
