Alger, Ingela and Weibull, Jörgen W. (2012) A generalization of Hamilton’s rules – Love others how much? Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 299. pp. 42-54.

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According to [Hamilton, 1964a] and [Hamilton, 1964b] rule, a costly action will be undertaken if its fitness cost to the actor falls short of the discounted benefit to the recipient, where the discount factor is Wright's index of relatedness between the two. We propose a generalization of this rule, and show that if evolution operates at the level of behavior rules, rather than directly at the level of actions, evolution will select behavior rules that induce a degree of cooperation that may differ from that predicted by Hamilton's rule as applied to actions. In social dilemmas there will be less (more) cooperation than under Hamilton's rule if the actions are strategic substitutes (complements). Our approach is based on natural selection, defined in terms of personal (direct) fitness, and applies to a wide range of pairwise interactions.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: April 2012
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Evolutionary stability, Altruism, Spite, Cooperation, Hamilton's rule
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:30
Last Modified: 22 Nov 2023 09:02
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