Azam, Jean-Paul and Thelen, Véronique (2012) Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism. TSE Working Paper, n. 12-316, Toulouse

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A simple game-theoretic model is first presented to bring out the conditions for terrorist
organizations to choose to perpetrate their attacks in a host country other than at home. This
emphasizes the diluted impact of counter-terrorism measures implemented in the host-country
on the number of attacks taking place there. These measures might attract more imported
attacks and mainly impact the number of attacks exported by the domestic terrorists without
affecting much the overall level of terrorist activity in the host country. The empirical results
presented provide some support to this prediction, by contrasting the econometric equations
that explain the number of attacks per country of origin vs. per host country. A dyadic
analysis is also presented. These analyses confirm the role of foreign aid as a counterterrorism
measure in the source country, but it raises the issue of its role in the host country. Although
foreign aid is confirmed as an effective tool for reducing the total number of attacks produced,
it affects the venue of these terrorist attacks. Military interventions are mostly counterproductive,
as they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2012
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:26
Last Modified: 26 Jan 2024 10:06
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