Cremer, Helmuth, Gahvari, Firouz and Pestieau, Pierre (2012) Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114 (4). pp. 1437-1459.

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Identification Number : 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01728.x


When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteris-
tics such as productivity and longevity, the population should be partitioned into
two groups: those who do not receive an inheritance those who do. The first tagged
group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group, when its type is fully
revealed, a first-best tax schedule. Receiving an inheritance makes high-ability
types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals face a be-
quest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can
be smaller as well as larger than 100% and may even be negative.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: December 2012
Refereed: Yes
JEL Classification: H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2014 17:26
Last Modified: 02 Apr 2021 15:47
OAI Identifier:

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