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Up a level- Journal of Economic Literature Classification (116)
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (116)
- C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (116)
- C70 - General (4)
- C79 - Other (1)
- C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory (116)
- C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (116)
Article
Ambec, Stefan
and Ehlers, Lars
(2016)
Regulation via the Polluter-Pays Principle.
The Economic Journal, vol. 126 (n° 593).
pp. 884-906.
Gensbittel, Fabien, Peski, Marcin and Renault, Jérôme
(2022)
Value-based distance between information structures.
Theoretical Economics, vol.17 (n°3).
pp. 1225-1267.
Renault, Jérôme and Forges, Françoise
(2021)
Strategic information transmission with sender's approval.
International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 50 (n° 2).
pp. 475-502.
Book Section
Yamashita, Takuro and Lomys, Niccolò
(2022)
A mediator approach to mechanism design with limited commitment.
In: EC'22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation.
Pennock, David M. (ed.)
Association for Computing Machinery.
Series “ACM Conferences.”
New-York. p. 334.
ISBN 978-1-4503-9150-4
Monograph
Enache, Andreea and Florens, Jean-Pierre
(2020)
Quantile Analysis of "Hazard-Rate" Game Models.
TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1117
Renault, Jérôme and Forges, Françoise
(2021)
Strategic information transmission with sender’sapproval.
TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1216, Toulouse.
