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Martimort, David
and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
(2011)
A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements.
TSE Working Paper, n. 11-251, Toulouse
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Abstract
We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign countries and possibly limited enforcement. Taking a mechanism design perspective, we study
how countries can agree on effort levels and compensations to take into account multilateral externalities. We delineate conditions for efficient agreements
and trace out possible inefficiencies to the conjectures that countries hold following disagreement. We show how optimal mechanisms admit simple approximations with attractive implementation properties. Finally, we also highlight how limits on commitment strongly hinder performances of optimal mechanisms.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 31 August 2011 |
| Place of Publication: | Toulouse |
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | public goods, incentive constraints, mechanism design, global warming |
| JEL Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Institution: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:45 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:33 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:24932 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/941 |
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