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Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

Che, Yeon-Koo, Iossa, Elisabetta and Rey, Patrick (2021) Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation. Review of Economic Studies. (In Press)

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Abstract

Procuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unveriable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the trade-off via two instruments: a cash prize and a follow-on contract. It primarily uses the latter, by favoring the innovator at the implementation stage when the value of the innovation is above a certain threshold and handicapping the innovator when the value of the innovation is below that threshold. A cash prize is employed as a supplementary incentive only when the value of innovation is sufficiently high. These features are consistent with current practices in the procurement of innovation and the management of unsolicited proposals.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2021
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Contract rights, Innovation, Prizes, Procurement and R&D.
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 08 Dec 2020 15:31
Last Modified: 13 Mar 2021 12:38
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124943
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41953

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