Salanié, François and Treich, Nicolas (2020) Public and private incentives for self-protection. Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, vol. 45 (n° 2). pp. 104-113.

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Identification Number : 10.1057/s10713-020-00050-3

Abstract

Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask in public during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside the house more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. However, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred)by a social planner.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: September 2020
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 09 Jul 2020 10:13
Last Modified: 28 Jul 2021 08:35
OAI Identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124422
URI: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41553

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