Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly

Mitraille, Sébastien and Moreaux, Michel (2011) Inventories and Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership in Two-period Cournot Oligopoly. TSE Working Paper, n. 11-249, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/24803

Abstract

Two-period Cournot competition between n identical firms producing at constant marginal cost and able to store before selling has pure strategy Nash- perfect equilibria, in which some firms store to exert endogenously a leader- ship over rivals. The number of firms storing balances market share gains, obtained by accumulating early the output, with losses in margin resulting
from increased competition and higher operation costs. This number and the industry inventories are non monotonic in n. Concentration (HHI) and competition increase due to the strategic use of inventories.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 27 July 2011
Place of Publication: Toulouse
JEL codes: D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:04
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2018 13:28
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:24803
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3603

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