Welfare Tradeoffs in U.S. Rail Mergers

Ivaldi, Marc and Mccullough, Gerard J. (2010) Welfare Tradeoffs in U.S. Rail Mergers. TSE Working Paper, n. 10-196

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/23459


The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the
full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such
renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question,
we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service
contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types
of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over
time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment.
We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant
but would accrue mostly to operators.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: 8 September 2010
JEL codes: L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L92 - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation - Autos, Buses, Trucks, and Water Carriers; Ports
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:02
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:22
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:23459
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3471

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