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Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process

Martimort, David, Poudou, Jean-Christophe and Sand-Zantman, Wilfried (2009) Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process. TSE Working Paper, n. 09-053, Toulouse

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21957

Abstract

We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.

Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
Language: English
Date: June 2009
Place of Publication: Toulouse
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 06:00
Last Modified: 19 Mar 2018 15:18
["eprint_fieldname_oai_identifier" not defined]: oai:tse-fr.eu:21957
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3229

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