Dissolution Power, Confidence Votes, and Policymaking in Parliamentary Democracies

Becher, Michael (2019) Dissolution Power, Confidence Votes, and Policymaking in Parliamentary Democracies. Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 31 (n° 2). pp. 183-208.

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Abstract

There is striking variation across parliamentary democracies in the power of prime ministers to employ two prominent procedures to resolve legislative conflict: the vote of confidence and the dissolution of parliament. While previous contributions in comparative politics have investigated each of these two fundamental institutions in isolation, I develop a simple unified model to unbundle how this richer variety of institutional configurations shapes political bargaining over policy. The analysis clarifies that the effects of the confidence vote and dissolution power interact. As a consequence, there can be a non-monotonic effect of increasing prime ministers’ formal power on their ability to shape the policy compromise. Counterintuitively, introducing dissolution power makes the prime minister worse off under some conditions. These results suggest new directions for empirical research on the consequences of parliamentary institutions for legislative politics and policy. They also lay analytical foundations for explaining institutional variation and reforms.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 1 March 2019
Refereed: Yes
Place of Publication: Londres
JEL codes: D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes - Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 13 Mar 2019 10:46
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2019 08:31
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:33063
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32081

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