Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance

Bonnet, Céline and Dubois, Pierre (2010) Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance. RAND Journal of Economics, 41 (1). pp. 139-164.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21036
Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: 2010
Refereed: Yes
JEL codes: L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce
C12 - Hypothesis Testing
C33 - Models with Panel Data
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:59
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:21
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:21036
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3160

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