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Bonnet, Céline
and Dubois, Pierre
(2010)
Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance.
RAND Journal of Economics, 41 (1).
pp. 139-164.
This is the latest version of this item.
Official URL : http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21036
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Date: | 2010 |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| JEL Classification: | L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; Warehousing; e-Commerce C12 - Hypothesis Testing C33 - Models with Panel Data |
| Subjects: | B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE |
| Divisions: | TSE-R (Toulouse) |
| Site: | UT1 |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jan 2012 05:59 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Apr 2021 15:36 |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:tse-fr.eu:21036 |
| URI: | https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3160 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:52)
- Inference on Vertical Contracts between Manufacturers and Retailers Allowing for Non Linear Pricing and Resale Price Maintenance. (deposited 18 Jan 2012 05:59) [Currently Displayed]
