Equilibrium refinement through negotiation in binary voting

Grandi, Umberto, Grossi, Davide and Turrini, Paolo (2015) Equilibrium refinement through negotiation in binary voting. In: 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015).

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We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another’s voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters’ rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the prevote phase.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Language: French
Date: 2015
Uncontrolled Keywords: Voting games on binary issues
Divisions: Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2019 14:31
Last Modified: 14 Mar 2019 14:31
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/29536

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