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October 22 - 28, 2018

International Charity under Asymmetric Information

Calmette, Marie-Françoise and Kilkenny, Maureen (2001) International Charity under Asymmetric Information. Economics Letters, 74 (1). pp. 107-111.

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Official URL: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/868

Abstract

Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.

Item Type: Article
Language: English
Date: November 2001
Refereed: Yes
Subjects: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE
Divisions: TSE-R (Toulouse)
Site: UT1
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2012 05:57
Last Modified: 07 Mar 2018 13:21
OAI ID: oai:tse-fr.eu:868
URI: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/2790

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